UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAR	
Angel Quintana, # 17975-056,) C/A No. 9:06-0436-GRA-GCK
Petitioner,) }
vs.))) Report and Recommendation
Federal Bureau of Prisons; Health Services Department; Ruth Yancey, Warden of FCI-Williamsburg,) Neport and Necommendation)))
Respondents.	<i>)</i>)

Background of this Case

The petitioner, who is a federal inmate at FCI-Williamsburg, has submitted a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In the § 2241 petition in the case at bar, the petitioner has brought suit against the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the Health Services Department of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the Warden of FCI-Williamsburg. On page 1 of the § 2241 petition, the petitioner indicates that the above-captioned case concerns "PROPER AND ADEQUATE MEDICAL ATTENTION/TREATMENT BY THE MEDICAL STAFF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS."



In the Statement of Facts appended to the petition, the petitioner outlines alleged deficiencies with his medical treatment at FCI-Edgefield (hernia, eyes, one vertebra), at FCI-Marianna (chest pain and blood), and at FCI-Williamsburg (heart attack and urological problems). In his prayer for relief, the petitioner seeks: (1) an injunction to prevent the BOP from transferring the petitioner "to evade" his medical problems; (2) an order directing the BOP "to address, treat, provide adequate, timely and proper medical attention" to each of the petitioner's medical problems and to "do so without an attitude of deliberate indifference and without the requirement that [the petitioner] speak english, to receive medical attention, all without unnecessary delay;" and (3) "Monetary damages in the amount of \$25,000.00 for unnecessary pain and suffering." The exhibits appended to the petition reveal that the petitioner completed his administrative remedies in the Federal Bureau of Prisons on December 22, 2005.

Discussion

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* petition pursuant to the procedural

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), and other habeas corpus statutes. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 118 L.Ed.2d 340, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1992 U.S. LEXIS® 2689 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-325, 1989 U.S. LEXIS® 2231 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS® 26108 (4th Cir. 1995)(en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1177, 134 L.Ed.2d 219, 116 S.Ct. 1273, 1996 U.S. LEXIS® 1844 (1996); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979)(recognizing the district court's authority to conduct an initial screening of a pro se filing);1 Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, Moffitt v. Loe, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Leeke v. Gordon, 439 U.S. 970 (1978). The petitioner is a pro se litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 & n. 7 (1980)(per

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¹Boyce has been held by some authorities to have been abrogated in part, on other grounds, by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)(insofar as Neitzke establishes that a complaint that fails to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), does not by definition merit sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)], as "frivolous").

curiam); and Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, petition, or pleading, the plaintiff's or petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). Even under this less stringent standard, the § 2241 petition — which raises civil rights claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs — is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, 1990 U.S.App. LEXIS® 6120 (4th Cir. 1990).

Deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With respect to medical care, a prisoner in a § 1983 case or <u>Bivens</u> action "must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." <u>Estelle v. Gamble</u>, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). *See also* <u>Farmer v. Brennan</u>, 511 U.S. 825, 833 128 L.Ed.2d 811, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1994 U.S.LEXIS® 4274 (1994), which was an action brought under <u>Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics</u>, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, supra, 403 U.S. at 397, the Supreme Court established a direct cause of action under the Constitution of the United States against federal officials² for the violation of federal constitutional rights. "Bivens is the case establishing, as a general proposition, that victims of a constitutional violation perpetrated by a federal actor may sue the offender for damages in federal court despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization for such suits." Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586, 589 n. 4, 1993 U.S.App. LEXIS® 25129 (1st Cir. 1993), which cites, inter alia, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)(restating Bivens rule). A Bivens claim is analogous to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: federal officials cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they do not act under color of state law. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 814-820 & n. 30 (1982). Harlow, which is often cited for the principle of the qualified immunity of state officials for acts within the scope of their employment, was brought against a federal official. In footnote 30 of the opinion in Harlow, the Supreme Court stated that Harlow was applicable to state officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other words, case law

²A <u>Bivens</u> action may not be brought against agencies of the United States. <u>FDIC v. Meyer</u>, 510 U.S. 471, 486, 127 L.Ed.2d 308, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1994 U.S. LEXIS® 1866 (1994)(declining to extend <u>Bivens</u> remedy to federal agencies).

involving § 1983 claims is applicable in <u>Bivens</u> actions and *vice versa*. *See* <u>Farmer v. Brennan</u>, <u>supra</u>; <u>Bolin v. Story</u>, 225 F.3d 1234, 1241-1242, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS® 22501 (11th Cir. 2000); and <u>Campbell v. Civil Air Patrol</u>, 131 F.Supp.2d 1303, 1310 n. 8, 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 2542 (M.D.Ala. 2001)(noting that, since courts have expanded the <u>Bivens</u> remedy, usually used for a Fourth Amendment violation, to allow direct action under First and Fifth Amendments, "the court shall refer interchangeably to cases" decided under both § 1983 and <u>Bivens</u>).

The claims raised in this case, however, are not proper § 2241 grounds. Whether filed by a state prisoner or federal prisoner, a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 has only been resorted to only in limited situations — such as actions challenging the administration of parole, Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 169-170, 1997 U.S.App. LEXIS® 15663 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 1991 U.S. LEXIS® 1772 (1991); computation of good time or jail time credits, McClain v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 9 F.3d 503, 504-505, 1993 U.S.App. LEXIS® 29079 (6th Cir. 1993); prison disciplinary actions, United States v. Harris, 12 F.3d 735, 736, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS® 735 (7th Cir. 1994); imprisonment allegedly beyond the expiration of a sentence, Atehortua v. Kindt, 951 F.2d 126,

129-130, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS® 29451 (7th Cir. 1991); or unsuccessful attempts to overturn federal convictions, <u>San-Miguel v. Dove</u>, 291 F.3d 257, 2002 U.S.App. LEXIS® 9581 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, <u>San-Miguel v. Dove</u>, 537 U.S. 938, 154 L.Ed.2d 242, 123 S.Ct. 46, 2002 U.S. LEXIS® 7311 (2002), and *cert. denied*, <u>Young v. Conley</u>, 537 U.S. 938, 123 S.Ct. 46, 2002 U.S. LEXIS® 7310 (2002).

The allegations raised by the petitioner in the above-captioned case are facially valid civil rights claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 125 L.Ed.2d 22, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2480, 1993 U.S. LEXIS® 4210 (1993); and Farmer v. Brennan, supra. The civil rights claims in this § 2241 action can be raised in a properly-filed Bivens action. The Clerk of Court has been directed to send Bivens forms to the petitioner.

Recommendation

Accordingly, it is recommended that the § 2241 petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondents to file a return. See Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir.)(federal district courts have duty

to screen habeas corpus petitions and eliminate burden placed on respondents caused by ordering an unnecessary answer or return), *cert. denied*, 400 U.S. 906 (1970); Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 697, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS® 5804 (8th Cir. 1996)("However, a petition may be summarily dismissed if the record clearly indicates that the petitioner's claims are either barred from review or without merit."); Baker v. Marshall, 1995 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 4614, *2-*3, 1995 WESTLAW® 150451 (N.D.Cal., March 31, 1995)("The District Court may enter an order for the summary dismissal of a habeas petition if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in this Court."); and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Respectfully submitted,

February **22**, 2006 Charleston, South Carolina

George C. Kosko United States Magistrate Judge

Notice of Right to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's "Report and Recommendation"

The **Serious Consequences** of a Failure to Do So

The petitioner is hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation (or Order and Recommendation) must be filed within **ten (10) days** of the date of service. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-271 (1976); and Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 3411 (D.S.C. 1993).

During the ten-day period for filing objections, but not thereafter, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he or she wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections. Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F. Supp. 42, 43-44, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 8250 (D.S.C. 1992); and Oliverson v. West Valley City. 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1467, 1995 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 776 (D.Utah 1995). Failure to file specific, written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Schronce v. United States, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-847 & nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he or she did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS® 8487 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Praylow v. Martin, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.)(party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Howard, supra, the Court stated that general, non-specific objections are not sufficient:

A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. *** This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the source of the

Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-1019 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who proceeded *pro se* in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district court:

Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only "I object" preserves no issue for review. *** A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.

See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046, 1989 U.S.App. LEXIS® 15,084 (8th Cir. 1989)("no de novo review if objections are untimely or general"), which involved a pro se litigant; and Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6 n. 1 (3rd Cir. 1984)(per curiam)("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity necessary to trigger de novo review"). This notice, hereby, apprises the petitioner of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written objections. See Wright v. Collins, supra; and Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16, 1989 U.S.App. LEXIS® 19,302 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections addressed as follows:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402